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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the model of Cabinet
Government functioned within the accepted parameters of the British
Constitution during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
A review of tradidonal views of the Bridsh Constitudon revealed that the
Prime Minister, as leader of the Government, holds great power and, with
the support of a tightly disciplined party in Parliament, is relatively secure in
power.
Examining the Suez Crisis in 1956, it is revealed that the Prime Minister and
many of his senior colleagues in the Cabinet engaged in a collusive
agreement with France and Israel to attack Egypt and bring the Suez Canal
under western control. Having contrived a casus belli, they proceeded to
mislead Parliament and the public as to their true motives and actions.
Although the secret dealings with France and Israel are troubling, an
analysis of these events leads to the conclusion that Cabinet Government
functioned within the constraints of the model during the Suez Crisis. The
parliamentary party would have supported the Government in its policy
decision, regardless of how that decision was reached.
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C a b in e t G o v e r n m e n t and t h e

1956

S u ez C r is is

In t r o d u c t i o n

The Suez Crisis of 1956 makes an interesting case study of British Cabinet
Government for a variety of reasons. First, when the Government embarked upon its
policy in July, 1956, it had the strong backing of the nation, the united support of all
parties in the House of Commons, and the unanimous support of the Western Alliance.
Within three months, that unity had been shattered. British forces were committed to
action under false pretenses and Britain faced almost universal condemnation throughout
the international community. From such a positive start, how could a Government headed
by a renowned foreign policy expert have chosen a policy doomed to failure? The failure
of the Eden Government, backed by highly competent civil servants within a system of
government that prides itself at wide-ranging consultation in order to promote consensus,
clearly demonstrates that Cabinet Government cannot guarantee that it will avoid significant
policy failures. While the Suez Crisis is unique in many regards, the role played by the
various groups involved— the Cabinet, Parliament, the Opposition, the Civil Service and
the Press— was entirely consistent with their perceived constitutional role. One cannot,
therefore, interpret the Suez policy as a failure of process. Rather, it was a failure of
judgment.
C a b in e t G o v e r n m e n t

There is no “constitution” per se in Great Britain, rather governments are formed,
operate, and are removed according to customs, known as conventions, which regulate the
exercise of the royal prerogative. Though voluntary, the binding nature of these
conventions is respected— most polidcal actors realize that the flexibility of action provided
by constitudonal convendons is more to their benefit than the rigidity of constitutional laws.
Over the life of the British state, the so-called constitution has been quite malleable, capable
of adapting to changing times and a changing world without having to rely on the lengthy
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court battles or constitutional fights over amendments characteristic of countries with
formal constitutions, such as the United States and Australia.
Prior to the first Reform Act in 1832, the British monarch had significant control
over not only the Government, but Parliament as well. By virtue of “rotten,” or “pocket,”
boroughs that were controlled by a few men loyal to the crown, a king could always rely
on significant support for ministers of his choosing. The Reform Act changed all that. The
number of boroughs controlled by royal supporters declined dramatically, and appeals for
votes had to be made to the general electorate. Membership in the House of Commons
could no longer be based on family or business influence, or the wishes of the monarch.
By 1841, it became apparent that the crown was compelled to choose a Prime Minister who
had the support and confidence of the majority in the House of Commons, even if such a
man were unpalatable to the monarch.
By the mid 19th Century, a general pracuce for appointing a Prime Minister had
emerged. Following a general election, the-leader of the party or coalition which had
accumulated a majority of the members of Parliament was summoned by the crown and
invited to form a government. While it took several decades for political parties to develop
and establish tight party discipline within Parliament, future Prime Ministers always had a
core following in Parliament that could generally be considered a “party”. Upon
acceptance, which was signified by kissing the Queen’s hand, the party leader became the
Prime Minister and he (and later she) then nominated a cabinet of senior ministers to lead
the major departments of government. The monarch had to appoint the Prime Minister's
list of cabinet nominees, despite some nostalgic attempts by Queen Victoria to manipulate
government formation. In modern times this approval has been purely p ro fo rm a .1 The
Prime Minister's choice of colleagues is his or hers alone and the ministers serve at the
pleasure of the Prime Minister through his or her advice to the Crown.

ilvor Jennings. Cabinet Government. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 54.
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In the 17th Century, the term “cabinet” referred to all the individuals who advised
the Crown as members of the Privy Council. Over time, the number of Privy Councilors
increased dramatically and many of them (appointed by Parliament) did not enjoy the full
confidence of the king. Following the Civil War, it became readily apparent that the size
and diverse political persuasions of the Privy Councilors resulted in an inefficient
mechanism for governmental control. According to Charles II, “The great Number of this
C o u n cill... made it unfit for the secrecy & dispatch that are necessary in many great
Affaires.”2 Increasingly, Charles came to rely on a small, secret committee known as the
Foreign Committee for advice. Under the auspices of foreign affairs, they advised him on
a wide range of issues and together they ran the country on a day-to-day basis.
While the Privy Council still met, though on an increasingly infrequent basis, the
real power and authority of the government gravitated to the smaller body that became
known simply as “the Cabinet.” Cabinet meetings were chaired by the King and were
attended by a small number of his ministers. While he initially attended Cabinet meetings
regularly, by 1717, George I’s attendance had become less frequent. While it has been
suggested that this was due to his inability to speak English, MacKintosh believes that
George appears to have preferred meeting with ministers individually instead of in groups
since they were easier to control that way.3 Over the next sixty years, the various
monarchs appear to have attended fewer than a dozen Cabinet meetings.
By the 19th Century, the Privy Council had become a historical relic while the
Ministers of State, meeting in the Cabinet and advising the crown, were the true center of
power in Britain. The Ministry still worked in close concert with the monarch but the
Reform Bill of 1832 fundamentally changed this relationship. With the abolition of rotten
boroughs, a significant number of Members of Parliament were no longer reliant on royal

2Charles quoted in John P. MacKintosh, The British Cabinet. (Toronto: The University o f Toronto Press,
1962), p. 34.
3Ibid„ p.48.
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preference for their positions, and had to appeal to broader electorate and the Sovereigns’
influence in Parliament dramatically declined. It soon became apparent that a ministry
without the support of an independent Parliament could not function and the monarch was
compelled to summon as Prime Minister an individual who had a strong following in the
Commons, whether or not that person was popular with the monarch. Following the 1832
Reform Act, royal acceptance of a Prime Minister’s selection of colleagues also became
purely formal. By the 1840’s, the monarch had ceased to be part of the working executive
and the Cabinet was wholly responsible to Parliament. In future, the monarch’s role would
be to simply “advise and to warn” about the appointment of ministers and other matters.
She would have no choice but to accept the advice of the Prime Minister.
The Cabinet developed out of the need to strike a balance between the Sovereign’s
power and that of Parliament. The King and his ministers governed, but those ministers
had to have the support of Parliament. The Cabinet therefore evolved as a link between
King and Parliament, but it depends upon the support of Parliament. As Bagehot put it, the
Cabinet is the “buckle” which fastens the executive to the legislature.4 Since the 1840s, it
has governed in the name of the Sovereign, but has received its authority from, and has
been answerable to, Parliament. According to Patrick Gordan Walker, “In the Cabinet and
the Cabinet alone could decisions of government be made and registered that were accepted
and executed by all the servants of the State."5
The actual composition of the Cabinet is nowhere specified by statute. According
to Ivor Jennings, “a minister is made a member of the Cabinet by a note from the Prime
Minister requesting him to attend.”6 Charles II governed in close association with five or
six ministers, primarily from the Treasury and the Admiralty, while his Privy Councilors
numbered more than thirty. By the 19th Century, Cabinets were about twice the size of

4Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution. (Government 410 Coursepack, 1867), p. 212.
^Patrick Gordan Walker, The Cabinet. (London: Jonathon Cape, 1972), p. 15.
6Jennings, p. 71.
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Charles’ and included all of the major ministry leaders. Cabinet Ministers now usually
include the heads of all the major ministries, leaders in both the House of Commons and
the House of Lords, and other party leaders who may serve as “ministers without
portfolio.” The number now is customarily between twenty and twenty-five.
The term “government” is much broader than the term “Cabinet.” A government
will include those holding major office who are members of the Cabinet, but will also
include other members of the majority party who hold positions within the government.
Some are ministers who head lesser departments, and others are known as junior ministers.
Originally created to serve as assistants to departmental ministers, the responsibilities of
junior ministers have evolved into shepherding a department's work and programs through
Parliament. They have been able to lighten the burdens on their ministers by answering
questions in Parliament, keeping party members advised of the department's program, and
carrying on minor tasks which would tend to clutter the minister's schedule. While most
junior ministers never rise above that office, it is considered a stepping stone to more
important offices within the government.7 In addition to junior ministers, the government
will include a number of whips whose responsibility it is to keep the backbenchers in
Parliament advised of government policies and help deliver winning majorities on all votes
before the House of Commons. Governments typically have about a hundred members.
Members of the government are expected to adhere to the doctrine of Collective
Responsibility, which is composed of three general principles8:
1. The Confidence Principle: In order for a Government to retain power, it
must maintain the confidence of Parliament on votes of Supply and
major votes on Government policy.
2. The Unanimity Principle: With very few exceptions, all members of the
Government, from full Cabinet Ministers down through the junior

7Kevin Theakston, Junior Ministers. (Padstow: T.J. Press Limited, 1987), pp. 9 - 10.
8G eoffrey Marshall, ed., Ministerial Responsibility. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp 3 - 4.
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ministers, must speak in favor of, and support, the Government in the
House of Commons.9
3. The Confidentiality Principle: The methods and discussions by which
decisions are reached in Cabinet are strictly confidential and not to be
revealed by any member of the Cabinet. The general premise derives
from the Unanimity Principle which dictates that all decisions of the
Cabinet are unanimous To reveal divisions within the Cabinet over
parucular points of policy infringes upon that principle.
In addidon to the doctrine of Collective Responsibility, individual ministers (be they
in the Cabinet or not) are expected to maintain the confidence of Parliament. Any minister
who fails to maintain Parliament’s confidence must resign. Interesdngly, few ministers
have been dismissed in such a manner by Parliament.10 Those who would be appear to be
in danger see (or are advised of) the “writing on the wall” and resign before receiving the
humiliation of a rejection by their peers.
Since the late 19th Century, the Cabinet has been the primary governmental
authority in Britain. With a Parliamentary majority based on strong party discipline, the
Cabinet can rest assured that its decisions will receive the necessary endorsements from the
House of Commons. The Cabinet is responsible for setting the parliamentary agenda,
introducing most legislation, and all financial legislation. Decisions and priorides are set by
the Cabinet on all issues that are part of the government’s agenda. Once decisions have
been reached, the Cabinet presents its program to Parliament as a united front. In order to
avoid unpleasant party splits that could destroy the effectiveness of the government,
Cabinet ministers and other members of the government abide by Collective Responsibility.
The doctrine sdfles party dissent by placing all party leaders on one side of an issue, and it
provides large numbers of votes from the junior ministers and whips. Nearly one-third of
a majority in the House of Commons are members of the government.

9 This principle has occassionally been suspended by coalition governments or due to a divisive fracture
over a particular issue within a party.
10Marsliall, p. 5.
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In modern Britain, Parliamentary approval of the Cabinet’s program is almost
automatic, given the rigid party discipline necessary to maintain a Parliamentary majority.
While Members of Parliament will almost invariably back their party’s leaders, Parliament
still plays an important role in governance. It serves as the forum in which the Government
must present its proposals and have them subjected to public criticism. In such
circumstances, the Government must defend its policies and ensure that they stand up to
public scrutiny. This process serves to keep the public informed of the Government’s
actions so that they will cast informed votes in subsequent Parliamentary elections. After
receiving Parliamentary approval, the Cabinet is able to implement its decisions because
Ministers have direct control over departments and the civil service.
This concentration of power has led to the widespread assertion that Britain does
not really have Parliamentary government. Rather it has Cabinet Government. There are
others who maintain that even this is not true, that Britain really has a Prime Ministerial
government because of the Prime Minister’s dominance in the Cabinet. Regardless of
whether the model is best described as Cabinet Government or Prime Ministerial
Government, the Cabinet plays a very important role in terms of policy coordination across
departments and as the forum where the most important issues facing the government of the
day are discussed and policy proscriptions adopted, and the Prime Minister plays a very
important role within the Cabinet.
The Cabinet functions much as a corporate board of directors does in the corporate
world. The Prime Minister, as chairman of the Cabinet, sets the Cabinet’s agenda,
determines what the feeling of the Cabinet is, and charts the Government’s course from
there. Seldom is a formal vote taken. As can be imagined, this system leaves the Prime
M inister with the power to determine what the consensus of his Cabinet is. Although it
would be an unwise Prime Minister who never heeded the advice of his Cabinet, the ability
to act decisively and independently is there. In describing one of Herbert Asquith’s
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Cabinet meetings, David Lloyd George once said, ‘T hey were all against it and said so; and
then Asquith rubbed his chin and said: ‘I think the balance of the argument is in favour’ and
put it through. He did that lots of times.” 11
Anecdotes such as this one have led many to believe that the Prime Minister is more
than just primus inter pares— first among equals— in the Cabinet.12 The Prime Minister
has the power to appoint all the members of the Cabinet and the Government, he can
remove them at will, and he can dissolve the Government of his own volition.13 There is
little check on his authority since he is not only leader of Government, but also of the
majority political party in the House of Commons and a mass, political party in the country.
As long as he can maintain the loyalty of his party, his hold on power is secure. Since the
Cabinet generally includes most the leading figures in the party’s parliamentary delegation,
the necessity of maintaining the Cabinet’s support serves as an important safeguard against
arbitrary Prime Ministerial rule.14
In day-to-day operations of the government, Cabinet ministers are responsible for
the efficient running of their departments and make sure that the government’s programs
are implemented by the department. Since ministers can only rely on a couple of political
appointees in the persons of junior ministers to assist them within the department, they are
compelled to forge strong working relationships with the permanent civil servants who
actually run the department. In exchange for their loyalty, the civil servants in each
department expect their Cabinet ministers to defend the department in the Cabinet and
Parliament, and, most importantly, to defend their budgets each year. Civil servants also
advise ministers on the merits of various policy proposals. In this capacity, they serve as
another safeguard against misguided or hastily developed Government policies. Since
1 t a l k e r , p. 29.
12Karl Loewenstein, British Cabinet Government. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 159.
13Alan Ward, R esponsible Governm ent, (Government 410 Coursepack, 1991), p. 6.
14Margaret Thatcher’s removal from power in 1991 by the Conservative Party Convention is a case in
point. By alienating many leading members o f her Cabinet and the majority o f her Party’s Members o f
Parliament, she failed to win what should have been simply a pro-forma re-election.
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ministers are usually generalists, not experts, it is a foolish minister indeed who does not
seek the advice of his senior civil servants.
While many ministers function almost exclusively within their large departments
(for example, the Department of Education), several have responsibilities that require a
special relationship with the Prime Minister and the rest of the Cabinet. The first among
these is the Foreign Secretary, who is responsible for managing relations with foreign
countries. Generally, the Foreign Secretary is given a place on each Cabinet meeting’s
agenda so that he can brief the Cabinet on diplomatic and international events. In modern
times, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister have worked very closely on a daily
basis coordinating the intricacies of foreign policy management. There are many theories
as to what sort of relationship they should have, but generally speaking, the Foreign
Secretary must either be a loyal lieutenant to the Prime Minister who sets major policy, or
be trusted by the Prime Minister to carry on his job independently. Conflict between the
two will lead, eventually, to embarrassing tension, lack of policy coordination, and the
ultimate departure of the Foreign Secretary.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer also holds a unique position within the
Government. As the individual in charge of setting the national budget each year, he is
often considered to be the second most powerful member of the government, next to the
Prime Minister. His official residence at 11 Downing Street does nothing to dispel this
impression. In close consultation with the Prinhe Minister, the Chancellor helps determine
fiscal and monetary policy for the nation. In his role supervising the national budget, he
has close contacts with all other departments of government, ascertaining their needs and
requirements for the coming year.
The modern Cabinet meets for only two to three hours a week and usually has a full
agenda discussing items of foreign policy, determining party strategy, the parliamentary
agenda, and coordinating the many offices of government. As a result, the full body
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cannot devote lengthy periods of time to discussing particular issues. In order to distribute
the burden of many on-going questions such as defense, economic policy and
parliamentary agendas, Cabinet committees are formed of principal ministers. Attendance
at Cabinet committees is not limited to members of the committee, and often other
ministers, junior ministers, military chiefs of staff, and civil servants are asked to attend.
Cabinet Committees are often responsible for drafting legislation that is too complicated for
a single minister to draft or inappropriate to turn over completely to civil servants.15 While
the Cabinet maintains hierarchical authority over a Cabinet Committee, the Committees
exercise a great deal of power because of the responsibilities that have been delegated to
them. Once the general principles of a particular issue have been set by the Cabinet, the
issue is generally directed to a committee to set the details and report back to the Cabinet
when it has completed its task. Often, reporting is very nominal. In fact, the Cabinet
Committee makes the decision, but the whole government is bound to it by Collective
Responsibility.
If a particularly complicated or fast-developing issue arises, the Cabinet often
creates an ad hoc Cabinet Committee to address the issue. This committee will work out
the major issues and disputes and present a course of action to the Cabinet for approval, or
it may take action in the name of the Cabinet, without consultation if it has been given that
authority. Cabinet Committees have also been established to investigate scandals,
misdeeds, or governmental debacles. By delegadng authority in this manner, the Cabinet
can maintain nominal control over decisions without spending a great deal of time
discussing the specifics, which many members may not understand or care about greatly.
Cabinets are wary of rejecting the recommendadons of Cabinet Committees, since the
premise behind the Committee is that it is acting in the stead of the whole Cabinet.
Depending on the issue, Cabinet Committees can wield great power, controlling the

15M acKintosli, p. 250.
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governmental apparatus as it applies to a particular issue and actually control government
policy for periods of tim e.16
The press in Britain is often viewed as the “fourth estate” in political life. Unelected
by the broader public, it plays a major role not only in influencing public opinion, but also
influencing public officials. Most newspapers in Britain tend to support one of the major
political parties in their editorial endorsements. In fact, politicians often have close
relationships with editors and reporters which allows them to influence the content of press
coverage and, through that, public opinion. In partisan elections, favorable press coverage
can significantly influence the results. Likewise, lukewarm endorsements or criticisms
from the media can have a negative effect of party support at the polls and on the tone of
criticism in Parliament. During times of crisis, the Government can seek to win over the
press by controlling the information provided to it and publication of potentially damaging
stories can be prevented under the Defence of the Realm Act by service of a “D-notice.”
The service of a D-notice is obviously a serious matter and the government can suffer
significant damage if their use is considered for political advantage. As a result, the use of
D-notices is very infrequent. The role of the press, although very public in appearance, is
often very subtle in its effect. The degree to which party leaders will modify their position
on issues to curry favor with the press is difficult to pin down. Nevertheless, the role of
the press in Parliamentary political life in Britain should riot be underestimated.
Modern Cabinets by themselves are unable to manage all the operations of
Government. As a result, they have relied on delegation of authority to Cabinet
Committees or to individual Ministers, preferring to give, or approve, only broad outlines
of goals, rather than specific policies. Although the Cabinet maintains overall
responsibility for decisions, it is not intricately involved in the finer details. Parliament and
the press are publicly involved in the criticism and defense of various Government policies

16Ibid„ p. 438.
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(or lack of policies), but are usually much further removed from the details of policy
creation than the Cabinet. As a result, policy development often rests in the hands of a few
Ministers whose departments have responsibility for implementing the policy. This
process provides no guarantee against failure.
T he H i s t o r y o f

the

S u e z C r i s i s , 1956

Anthony Eden became Prime Minister in April, 1955, the hand-picked successor of
Winston Churchill. Eden had a degree from Oxford in Persian and Arabic and had, for a
time, thought of entering the diplomatic service. Instead, he entered Parliament where he
became, at age thirty-eight, one of the youngest Foreign Secretaries ever in 1935. Eden
had participated in the Chamberlain Cabinet prior to World War Two, but resigned to
protest Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement. He returned as Foreign Secretary in
Churchill’s Cabinet during World War Two. He also served as Foreign Secretary in
Churchill’s Cabinet from 1952-55. In that capacity, in 1954, he negotiated the 1954
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement for withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone and
gained Cabinet approval despite doubts expressed by Churchill.17 The agreement
implemented the phased withdrawal of British troops from Egypt that was called for in the
1936 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, “provided they were no longer needed.” The new treaty
allowed Britain to return to the Canal Zone if an Arab State or Turkey were attacked by a
non-Middle Eastern power.18 In opposition to this agreement, a group of Conservative
MPs, known as “The Suez Group,” was formed.
On July 19,1956, the United States abrupdy withdrew $130 million in loan
guarantees for the construction of the Aswan High Dam, Egypt’s major public works
program. This move was prompted by concerns about Egyptian President Game! Nasser’s
close association with the Communist bloc states and his repeated attempts to play the
superpowers against one another. The following day, Britain followed suit, withdrawing
17Keith Kyle, Suez. (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 50 - 54.
18David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis. (N ew York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 12 - 13.
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the $80 million in loan guarantees. In retaliation for the American and British action,
Nasser announced the nationalization of the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company on July
26. At the July 27 Cabinet meeting, the Cabinet created an ad hoc Cabinet Committee
comprised of Eden, Lord Salisbury, Harold Macmillan, Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Home and
Walter Monckton, the Egypt Committee, to take responsibility for managing the Suez
c risis.19
Eden, the Cabinet, and Parliament were all very concerned about the nationalization
of the Suez Canal Company and its impact on British interests in the Middle East. Since its
opening in 1869, the Canal had long been considered the vital link between Britain and its
most important colony, India. Even after India had gained independence, the Canal was
viewed as an important strategic asset and an important transit point between Europe and
the Far East. Selwyn Lloyd notes:
In 1955, 14,666 ships had passed through it, one-third of them
British, three-quarters of them belonging to NATO countries.
Annually 70 million tons of oil came through it, of which 60
million tons was for Western Europe. That was two-thirds of
Western Europe’s total oil supplies, and to bring it round the
Canal would require twice the tonnage of tankers.20
The Canal had been operated by the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal under
an exclusive concession that was supposed to last through 1968. The company was
chartered in Egypt and publicly traded, with the British Government owning 44% of the
shares and the balance being traded on the Paris stock exchange. According to Cabinet
minutes, the Cabinet conceded that the nationalization of the Canal was completely legal
under international law because Nasser had undertaken to compensate all the shareholders
of the Company at the prevailing share price the day prior to nationalization, so no
reasonable claim could be made that Nasser had acted illegally. There was no immediate
military remedy available to the British because it would take many weeks to assemble the

19fCyle, p. 139.
20Selw yn Lloyd, .Suez 1956: A Personal Account. (London: Jonathon Cape, 1978), p. 83.
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forces necessary to seize the Canal, so there was no doubt that the problem would be a
drawn out one. The Cabinet decided that the Canal was not just “a piece of Egyptian
property but an international asset of the highest importance [which] should be managed as
an international trust.”21 It almost goes without saying that they felt such an international
trust would be dominated by Britain and France.
To facilitate the return of the Canal to reliable, friendly control, parallel strategies
were undertaken. On the diplomatic front, Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, was
instructed to carry out discussions with the French in order to coordinate a common
response. Eden also sent a message to President Eisenhower advising him that the British
were seeking a peaceful end to the crisis by putting political pressure on the Egyptians, but
that military force would be used as a last resort.22 On the military front, the Chiefs of
Staff were asked to undertake planning for an offensive to restore the Canal Zone to British
control, and many Reservists were called to action. On the domestic political front, Eden
gave a speech in the House of Commons condemning the nationalization of the Canal and
stating that Britain would not allow one nation to control it, and possibly exploit that
control in the future. Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Opposition Labour Party, gave a
strong speech in support of the Government’s firm stand over the nationalization. He
referred to Nasser as a Hider or a Mussolini, and was roundly cheered (instead of jeered)
by the Conservative backbenchers. The British Press was equally bellicose, demanding
immediate action to return the Canal to British control.23
The initial American reaction to the Anglo-French response to the nationalization of
the Canal was positive. Secretary of State Dulles was adamant that some sort of
international authority had to be established to run the Canal; that it could not be left to
Nasser and the Egyptian Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived nationalization

2 C a b in e t Minutes quoted in Carlton, Britain and the vSuez Crisis, p. 133.
22Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, p. 113*14.
23Richard Lamb, The Failure o f the Eden Government. (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987), p. 201.
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as a threat to vital American interests and developed plans to support a British-French
invasion, even envisioning a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. In their
reasoning can be seen the foundations of the “domino theory” that was to become more
widely known a decade later when applied to Southeast Asia. Daniel Calhoun writes:
The Joint Chiefs concurred, and then some! Nasser had to be
“broken.” America and her allies had to put the Canal “under a
friendly and responsible authority at the earliest practicable
date.” The alternative was a triumphant Nasser dominating the
Arab world “from Morocco to Iraq” and threatening U.S.
interests throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Western
prestige would sink so low that, ultimately, the United States
would be ousted from its bases from Iceland to the Azores,
from Spain to the Philippines. The Soviet Union would move
in to take effective control of the entire Middle East, denying
our European allies their oil supplies and effectively breaking
them economically. The United States could not let all that
happen.24
Unfortunately for the British and French Governments, these views did not carry
the day with Eisenhower. He was advised by hawks at the Pentagon who favored a
military move, but he himself favored a less military response. Despite his own long career
in the military, Eisenhower was not inclined to let the military dictate American foreign
policy. The experts at the State Department had concluded that the nationalization of the
Suez Canal, although not in the United States’ best interests, was based on solid legal
ground. With this in mind, Eisenhower wrote back to Eden urging him to avoid military
force, and instead, to call a conference of maritime nations to discuss the disposition of the
Canal.25 This letter should have alerted Eden that Eisenhower was not inclined to support
military intervention.
At the urging of American Secretary of State Dulles, the British Government called
for a conference of users of the Suez Canal because, in the words of Dulles, “a way had to
be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to swallow.”26 Despite the
24Daniel F. Callioun, Hungary and the Suez. 1956: An Exploration o f Who Makes History. (Lanham:
United Press o f America, 1991), p. 135.
25K yie, p. 160.
26Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, p. 41.
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earlier message from Eisenhower expressing disapproval of any British plan to seize the
Canal by force, it was Dulles’ belligerent talk that convinced Eden that the Americans
would back him up if push came to shove. Egypt was invited to the conference, the goal of
which was to come to some reasonable accommodation over the future operation of the
Suez Canal. The London Conference began on August 16 and was attended by 22
nations— only Egypt and Greece declined invitations to attend the conference. It called on
Egypt to let the Canal be administered by an independent international body, and to open
the Canal to the ships of all maritime nations, regardless of political affiliation. Nasser
rejected the Conference’s recommendations out of hand.
Meanwhile, the British Chiefs of Staff had submitted a plan for a military response
to the Egypt Committee on August 10. The plan, known as “Musketeer,” was quite
ambitious. It went beyond the limited objective of seizing the Suez Canal to the goal of
seizing all of Egypt and driving out Nasser. While the plan envisioned using only British
troops, the French had promised their support for British action and had committed forces
to serve under British command. In the Egypt Committee, the Chancellor, Harold
Macmillan, favored the Musketeer plan while Eden and Lloyd favored a scaled-down
version, with the Canal as a limited objective, so as to avoid antagonizing world opinion.27
Following the rejection of the London Conference proposals by Nasser, Dulles
suggested to the British and French that another conference be called in London to set up a
body to be known as the Suez Canal Users’ Association (SCUA). Despite French
misgivings, the British Cabinet agreed to support this idea on September II. Macmillan
stated his opinion that this conference was simply another pro form a step towards the use
of force, which he perceived as inevitable, but this view was not accepted by the Cabinet as
a whole which felt that force should only be used if peaceful means failed.28 Meanwhile,
Gaitskell and the Labour Party had changed their tune and were no longer in complete
27K yle, p. 175.
28Cabinet Minutes quoted in Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, p. 137-39
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support of the Government’s policy. They now insisted that any military action be taken
under the auspices of the United Nations.
The SCUA was established at the Second London Conference on September 21.
The SCUA was to be an international organization of maritime states that used the Suez
Canal. It would be responsible for administering the Canal and setting tolls and would
work in concert with the Egyptian Canal Authority. Egypt would then be given a
percentage of the tolls at a rate determined by the SCUA and the remainder would go
towards maintenance and development of the Canal. The British and French felt betrayed
by Dulles’ manipulation of the conference that left SCUA with only limited powers.
According to Eden’s spokesman, William Clark, “Dulles pulled rug after rug from under us
and watered down the Canal Users’ Association till it was meaningless.”29
This proposal immediately ran into trouble with Nasser who was not pleased with
any of the proposed conditions, asking rhetorically, “Would Britain ever concede control of
the Docklands to some ‘Port of London User’s Association’?”30 Furthermore,
Washington began distancing itself from imposing the already limited SCUA by force, with
Dulles proclaiming that the U.S. “wouldn’t shoot its way through the Canal” if denied
transit by Egypt.31 This infuriated Eden, because it was Dulles who had proposed the
SCUA in the first place.
With the U.S. distancing itself from SCUA, a diplomatic schism was beginning to
become apparent. On September 11, Eden proposed to take the matter to the United
Nations Security Council, in part to head off the Soviet Union, which appeared to be
following a similar path, in part to appease the Labour Opposition, who were demanding
that Britain use the United Nations collective'security apparatus established after World

29K yle, p. 254.
30Calhoun, p. 123.
31 K yle, p. 246.
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W ar Two, and in part to assure public opinion that everything possible was being done
short of war.
Given the failure to supply the SCUA with “the teeth” necessary to enforce its
proposals, the Foreign Secretaries of Britain and France were dispatched to the United
Nations in New York to carry on direct negotiations with the Egyptian Government. Great
progress was made at these meetings, with six points for a peaceful settlement being agreed
by all parties:32
1. There should be free and open transit through the Canal without
discrimination, overt or covert.
2. The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected.
3. The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any
country.
4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement
between Egypt and the users.
5. A fair proportion of the dues should be allocated to Egyptian
development.
6. Unresolved disputes between the Suez Canal Company and Egypt
should be settled by arbitration.
Although diplomatic efforts appeared to be making progress, at the same time
military preparations were ongoing. Reservists remained activated and ships and material
were in transit to staging areas for an invasion designed to secure the Canal Zone. The
invasion could be put on hold for only so long before the troops had to be ordered either to
stand down or to attack. Pressure from the Chiefs of Staff was building for a stand down
order to be given. Eden was not prepared to stand down for fear of appearing weak, but
with Selwyn Lloyd’s apparent progress on the diplomatic front, it was difficult to justify
continuing the operation. The French were to give Eden a way out.
On October 14, Albert Gazier, the French Acting Foreign Minister, and General
Maurice Challe, Deputy Chief of Staff for the French Air Force, arrived at the Prime
Ministerial retreat, Chequers, to meet secretly with Eden and the Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, without the presence of civil servants or ambassadors.

32Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, p. 52.
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The French proposed to the British that Israel should be encouraged to attack Egypt,
thereby creating a “threat” to the security of the canal. Britain and France would issue an
ultimatum to both sides to withdraw from the area around the Canal so that British and
French forces, in the role of peacekeepers, could occupy the Canal and ensure that the free
flow of shipping was not hindered. Hence, the Canal would be returned to Western
control and the Suez Crisis effectively ended. General Challe commented of Eden:
“His anxiety was to have the appearance of not being the
aggressor. The general hypocrisy required that one prepared
more or less lame pretexts. They deceived nobody but certain
persons pretended to believe them. As if confiscation of the
Canal was not enough. Thus I presented the pretext or rather
the scenario that he wanted.”33
Eden promised the French that he would send them a reply by October 16. According to
Nutting, Eden was instantly enamored with the plot. He adds, “I knew then that, no matter
what contrary advice he might receive over the next forty-eight hours, the Prime Minister
i

had already made up his mind to go along with the French plan.”34
Lloyd returned from the United Nations in New York immediately after being
summoned by Eden and the Egypt Committee met again in secret on October 16 with all the
members present, plus Lord Kilmuir and Peter Thorneycroft. Eden brought up the French
plan for collusion. Monckton had some objections, but the rest of the committee supported
the Prime Minister, including Lloyd, although he still believed his diplomatic efforts might
be successful.35 It was determined that Lloyd and Eden would go to Paris to confer with
the French and iron out the details of the arrangement. In Paris, Eden and Lloyd met with
Guy Mollet, the French Premier, and once again, civil servants were excluded. This
resulted in a stinging letter from the British ambassador to Lloyd demanding to know why
he had not been invited to attend the talks. Following Eden’s instructions, Lloyd brushed

33Ibid., p. 56.
34Anthony Nutting, N o End o f a Lesson: The Storv o f Suez. (London: Constable, 1967), p. 94.

35Lamb, p. 233.
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off the ambassador’s protests.36 At the meeting, Eden insisted that Britain should be “kept
strictly out of the ‘collusion’” and that the French make all the appropriate arrangements
with the Israelis, thus guaranteeing that in public, Britain’s honor would be intact.37
On October 18, the Cabinet met and Lloyd reported on the progress of his talks in
New York with which he was quite pleased. He felt that the six principles endorsed by the
Security Council could form the basis for negotiations with Egypt. The Cabinet decided
that Lloyd should, in concert with the French, request that the Egyptians submit a proposal
for implementing the six principles. The Prime Minister then reported on his trip to Paris,
although he was not entirely forthcoming. He indicated that the Israelis were gearing up
for some sort of military move, not that Britain and France were encouraging them to
invade Egypt. Eden also pointed out that if Israel attacked Jordan, British obligations to
Jordan required that Britain defend it against aggression. Since it was not in Britain’s
interest to be engaged in war with the Israelis, he had asked the French to let the Israelis
know that Britain would honor its obligations to Jordan, but since “Egypt was in breach of
a Security Council resolution [regarding free transit of Israeli shipping through the Suez]
and had repudiated Western aid under the Tripartite Declaration,”38 Britain would not come
to its assistance in the case of an Israeli attack. No objections were raised when Eden
informed the Cabinet that he felt that fighting over the Canal should be avoided at all costs,
but Eden was actually priming the Cabinet for military action, just as negotiations at the
United Nations were beginning to bear fruit.39 At the same time, Walter Monckton moved
out of the Defence Ministry and into the role of “Paymaster General” because of his
opposition to any alliance with France and Israel to attack Egypt. Nevertheless, he stayed

36K yle, p. 303.
37Calhoun, p. 275.
38 The 1950 Tripartite Declaration by the United States, France and Britain guaranteed borders in the Middle
East and promised an armed response to any aggression in die region.
39Cabinet Minutes quoted in Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, p. 142.
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in the Cabinet because he felt his departure during the crisis would severely damage the
Governm ent.40
The Israelis were not motivated by British or French interests. They felt that the
Egyptian blockade of the Red Sea port of Eilat and fedayeen terrorist attacks on Israel from
the Sinai and the Gaza Strip justified a preemptive Israeli attack on Egypt, quite
independently of Egypt’s nationalization of the Canal. David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Prime
Minister, was wary of the British efforts to avoid direct contact with his government and
demanded a face-to-face meeting with a senior member of the British Government before
any invasion plans were decided. He did not feel that it was wise for Israel to “mount the
rostrum of shame so that Britain and France could bathe their hands in waters of purity.”41
On October 22, Lloyd traveled secretly to the Paris suburb of Sdvres with Patrick Dean,
Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, to meet with Ben-Gurion to discuss
the terms under which Israel would initiate action against Egypt with British assurances of
support. There appears to be ample evidence that Lloyd was not pleased with his task, and
he might even have attempted to sabotage the meeting. Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Chief of
Staff who was present at Sdvres, recalled in his memoirs that “Britain’s Foreign Minister
may well have been a friendly man, pleasant, charming, amiable. If so, he showed near
genius in concealing these virtues. His manner could not have been more antagonistic.
His whole demeanor expressed distaste— for the place, the company and the topic.”42
According to Nutting, he had “seldom seen a man more confused and unhappy than Lloyd
was on this occasion.”43
Lloyd returned to London empty-handed. There was, as yet, no agreement with
France and Israel, but according to Cabinet minutes, Eden reported to the October 23
Cabinet meeting that “ [f]rom secret conversations which had been held in Paris with
40Lord Birkenhead, Walter Monckton. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 307 - 309.
4 C a lh o u n , p. 276.
42M oshe Dayan, Storv o f Mv L ife. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p. 180.
43Nutting, p. 99.
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representatives of the Israeli Government, it now appeared that the Israelis would not alone
launch a full-scale attack against Egypt.”44 This indecisive report was matched by Lloyd
who reiterated his view that diplomatic negotiation might result in Egypt meeting all British
demands for the operation of the Canal, but the goal of bringing down Nasser (or at least
limiting his influence) was not a reasonable prospect. He also advised the Cabinet that the
military preparations that had been underway since late July could not be held in readiness
many days longer.45
According to Lloyd, only Charles Peake, Minister of Pensions, and Lord Woolton,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, were not present on October 23 46 Of the eighteen
Cabinet Ministers, therefore, all but two were at this crucial meeting where it was revealed
that the Government had been in contact with Israel, that the topic of discussion was action
against Egypt, and the Israeli would not act alone.
On October 24, Eden sent Dean and Donald Logan, Lloyd’s Assistant Private
Secretary, back to Sdvres with specific instructions to make a deal with the French and
Israelis. And despite Ben-Gurion’s clear intention that Britain should declare its support
for Israel, Eden also had Dean deliver a letter specifically declaring that Britain was not
asking Israel to take action.47 Dayan commented in his diary, “Save for the Almighty, only
the British are capable of complicating affairs to such a degree.”48 After a brief discussion,
Dean signed the following document, the Sdvres Protocol:49
The results of the conversations which took place at Sdvres from 22-24 October
1956 between representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the State
of Israel and of France are the following:
1.

The Israeli forces launch on the evening of 29 October 1956 a large scale attack
on the Egyptian Forces with the aim of reaching the Canal zone the following
day.

44Calhoun, p. 142.
45Ibid„ p. 143.
46Lloyd, p. 185.
47Lamb, p. 241.
48Calhoun, p. 278.
49K yle, p. 565 - 566

24

2.

On being apprised on these events, the British and French Governments during
the day of 30 October 1956 respectively and simultaneously make two appeals
to the Egyptian Government and the Israeli Government on the following lines:
A.

To the Egyptian Government:
(a) halt all acts of war,
(b) withdraw all its troops ten miles from the Canal,
(c) accept temporary occupation of the Canal by the Anglo-French
forces to guarantee freedom of passage through the Canal by
vessels of all nations until a final settlement.
B . To the Israeli Government:
(a) halt all acts of war,
(b) withdraw all its troops ten miles to the east of the Canal.
In addition, the Israeli Government will be notified that the French and
British Governments have demanded of the Egyptian Government to accept
temporary occupation of key positions along the Canal by Anglo-French
forces.
It is agreed that if one of the Governments refused, or did not give its
consent within twelve hours the Anglo-French forces would intervene with
the means necessary to ensure that their demands are accepted.
C.

The representatives of the three Governments agree that the Israeli
Government will not be required to meet the conditions in the appeal
addressed to it, in the event that the Egyptian Government does not
accept those in the appeal addressed to it for their part.

3.

In the event that the Egyptian Government should fail to agree within the
stipulated time to the conditions of the appeal addressed to it, the Anglo-French
forces will launch military operations against the Egyptian forces in the early
hours of the morning of 31 October.

4.

The Israeli Government will send forces to occupy the western shore of the
Gulf of Akaba and the group of islands Tirane and Sanafir to ensure freedom
of navigation in the gulf of Akaba.

5.

Israel undertakes not to attack Jordan during the period of operations against
Egypt.
But in the event that during the same period Jordan should attack Israel, the
Bridsh Government undertakes not to come to the aid of Jordan.

6. * The arrangements of the present protocol must remain strictly secret.
7.

They will enter into force after the agreement of the three Governments.

(signed)
David Ben-Gurion
I s r a el

P a t ri c k Dean
United Kingdom

Christian
France

P i n ea u
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Dean and Logan promptly returned to London with their copy of the Protocol
Eden was shocked to find that these two civil servants had actually signed something, and
ordered it destroyed. Dean and Logan were sent back to Paris to retrieve the French and
Israeli copies, but were unsuccessful because the Israelis had already returned to Israel and
the French would not destroy the only remaining copy of the agreement.50
The October 25 meeting of the Cabinet was to prove to be fateful. Eden informed
the Cabinet that an Israeli attack on Egypt now appeared imminent, possibly as soon as
October 29. Apparently, he did not mention the Sdvres Protocol, or the meetings with the
Israelis, to the whole Cabinet. He did report the French Government had indicated that, in
the case of an Israeli attack on Egypt, they would intervene regardless of British actions.
Eden felt that it would be appropriate for Britain and France to issue an ultimatum to both
sides calling for a cease-fire and for the withdraw of their forces from within ten miles of
the Canal so that a joint Anglo-French force could occupy and protect the Canal. Failure to
comply with the ultimatum would result in forced British and French intervention in the
Canal Zone.51 This statement was wholly in line with the British commitment made at
Sdvres, but did not make clear that Britain and France had already committed themselves to
support Israel. The following statement by Eden appears in the Cabinet minutes:
We must face the risk that we should be accused of collusion
with Israel. But this charge was liable to be brought against us
in any event; for it could now be assumed that, if an AngloFrench operation were undertaken against Egypt, we should be
unable to prevent the Israelis from launching a parallel attack
themselves; and it was preferable that we should be seen to be
holding the balance between Israel and Egypt rather than appear
to be accepting Israeli co-operation in an attack on Egypt
alone.52
As with the letter Eden had Dean deliver to the Israelis, requesting they not take action, this
would appear to be an attempt either to leave a false trail for future historians, or to mislead
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5 l Cabinet Minutes quoted in Carlton, Britain and (he Suez Crisis, p. 146.
52Lamb, p. 243.
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members of the Cabinet, or both. After discussing the pros and cons of the plan, the
Cabinet gave the Prime Minister the approval he needed to issue an ultimatum in the event
of Israel’s attack on Egypt. The Cabinet decision was unanimous, with Lloyd giving his
full support to the Prime Minister despite the apparent progress he had been making at the
United Nations.53
On October 29, the Israelis attacked Egypt, in compliance with to the commitments
they had made at Sdvres. The next day, the British Cabinet met to discuss the situation and
Lloyd was authorized, in concert with the French, to send an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel
in the spirit of the October 25 Cabinet discussions. Since the action appeared so blatantly
opportunistic, and as Eden recognized in Cabinet on October 25, would appear to be
collusive with Israel, the position of the Government was difficult for some to support. It
immediately faced the resignation of two Junior Ministers, Nutting and Edward Boyle, the
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who left to protest the action. Nutting’s departure
was particularly harmful because, in his role as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and
as a Middle Eastern specialist,54 he was privy to the plan of collusion. However, as one
Cabinet official said a century before, “This is a bad case, an indefensible case. We must
apply our majority to this question.”55 And that is exactly what the Eden Government
proceeded to do. In Parliament, Eden blamed Egypt’s terrorism and blockade of Israel for
the Israeli invasion, and he effectively abrogated British obligations under the Tripartite
Declaration, thereby reversing his commitment to the House less than a year earlier that
Britain would “assist Israel if she were attacked or assist an Arab country if she were
attacked by Israel.”
Despite earlier speeches by Gaitskell and Bevan railing against Colonel Nasser’s
regime in Cairo, the Labour Party was not convinced of the good intendons of the

53Calhoun, p. 289.
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55Bagehot, p. 295.
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Government because of its failure to act through the United Nations. Christopher
Mayhew, a Labour backbencher, suggested in the House that the Government was “using
this opportunity to fulfill their long-cherished designs to regain control of the Suez Canal...
they are trying to link up the Israeli incursion with the Suez problem.”56 Eden asked that
the Opposition “not impugn our motives,”57 but Mayhew’s comment was an astute one
and would have been entirely correct, even if Eden had not invited the Israeli attack.
The full debate in the House of Commons the next day was even more bitter than
the brief discussion which followed Eden’s announcement on October 29. For the
Opposition, Gaitskell demanded to know why the matter had not been referred to the
United Nations Security Council. He failed to find any legal justification for the
Government’s actions, and was bewildered by the sudden shift in foreign policy in favor of
Israel. The statements of Henry Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador to the United
Nations, further fueled Labour’s fire. Lodge was particularly vocal in expressing
American opposition to British and French action outside the framework of the United
Nations and without prior consultation with the United States. The Government found it
difficult and embarrassing to explain the obvious trans-Atlantic breach. Eden’s response to
his failure to work through the United Nations was that the Security Council could not be
counted on to move quickly and the Russian veto made it impossible to make any real
progress at the United Nations. Lloyd reiterated that the imminent nature of the Israeli
threat to the Canal called for British intervention, but Labour was not convinced and
divided the House on the adjournment vote. Although the Government won handily,
Labour had set the stage for a divisive Parliamentary battle instead of the show of national
unity that the Government would have preferred as it entered into the crisis.58

56Nutting, p. 119.
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The normally Conservative-friendly press was less than fully supportive of the
Government. Eden personally briefed Iverach McDonald, the Foreign Editor of The
Times, about the British arrangement with the French and Israelis. McDonald did not
report his full knowledge of the events behind the Suez War, but the paper did not endorse
the Government’s actions.59 The Daily Telegraph announced its endorsement of the
Government’s action because the editorial board believed that the United Nations had failed
in the Middle East. The Daily Mail, although generally supportive of the action, stated that
prior United Nations approval would have been a preferable course of action.60 The
Liberal Observer ran an editorial which included the line, “We had not realized that our
Government was capable of such folly and such crookedness.”61
The situation began to deteriorate badly for Eden’s Government almost as soon as
the joint ultimatum had been issued. In New York, the United Nations Security Council
met in emergency session to discuss the Israeli invasion and the Briush and French ultimata
and the United States tabled a motion demanding that Israel withdraw to its own borders.
Pierson Dixon, Britain’s United Nations representative, was instructed not to support any
measure calling for Israeli withdrawal and was, in effect, told to avoid any commitments
being made by the Security Council. The American motion moved rapidly to a vote despite
the best efforts of Britain and France at delay, and it was vetoed by Britain and France, the
first ever veto by Britain.62 On October 31, Bridsh planes began bombing Egyptian air
fields, to fulfill the Bridsh commitment to neutralize the Egypdan Air Force, and leaflets
were dropped suggesting to Egyptians that they depose Nasser, hardly the act of a neutral
peacekeeper.63
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It should come as no surprise that the next debate in Commons on November 1 was
bedlam because it was on a Labour motion of censure. The Opposition front bench openly
accused the Government of collusion with Israel and France and the jeers of its members
made debate almost impossible. At one point, the Speaker suspended the sitting for half an
hour so that tempers could cool. Gaitskell contemptuously asked the Government about
the United Nations veto:
The Foreign Secretary has made much play with the fact that the
United Nations is not much good because anything put forward
is vetoed. Who was responsible for the veto this time? Only
the British and French Governments. If it had not been for
their action, there would have been a unanimous resolution of
the Security Council. I can only describe this as a major act of
sabotage against the United Nations.64
Lloyd responded to the charge of collusion by saying, “It was wrong to suggest
that Israel had been incited on this occasion by the British Government. There was no
prior agreement between us about it.’’65 According to Suez historian Keith Kyle, “The first
[statement] could presumably just be excused on the grounds that the incitement came from
the French Government and was merely abetted by Britain. But one need go no further
than the second to answer the question of whether or not the House was specifically
m isled.’’66
Not only did the Government face opposition from the Labour Party, they were
also faced with the possibility of a challenge from their own backbenchers. On November
1, there were already signs that Eden’s plot was becoming public knowledge and that the
Conservative Party was fracturing on the issue:
Mr. William Yates (The Wrekin, C.) on a point of order, said: I
am a young member of this House and I desire your advice,
Mr. Speaker. I have been to France, and I have come to the
conclusion that her Majesty’s Government have been in an
international conspiracy. (Loud and prolonged Opposition
cheers, and Conservative cries of “Sit down!”)
64“In Parliament,”77i£ Times, November 1, 1956, p. 4.
65Ibid.
66K yle, p. 379.
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“Would it be right (he continued) if I disagreed with what the
Government have done? (Renewed interruptions.)
“I want to know whether it would be considered right and
patriotic for a person deliberately to try to bring down her
Majesty’s Government in these circumstances? (Loud
Opposition cheers and Ministerial cries of “Sit down!”)
“The Speaker said that was not a point of order. ‘If my
impression is right, there are quite a number of members of this
House who are engaged in that enterprise.’ (Laughter.)67
Although the Whips were to keep Yates and most other doubting M.P.s in line, their best
argument for holding the Conservative Party together was loyalty to the nation at a time of
international crisis.
Yates was obviously correct that there was an international conspiracy. The French
were making little secret of their close interactions with Israeli forces. French planes were
stationed on Israeli soil and bore joint force markings. French ships had shelled Egyptian
positions in support of Israeli land assaults in the Sinai. At the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone
Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Secretary, received a cable from Ralph Murray, a British
Political advisor in Cyprus, that stated, “as seen from here there is little if anything covert
about French close and active support of Israel.”68 The British, more concerned with
appearances, were generally going about business as if they really were even-handed
peacekeepers. The French behavior only served to infuriate Eden, but there was little he
could do to stop them.69
At the United Nations, debate on the Israeli invasion and the British-French
ultimatum was moved from the Security Council to the General Assembly where Britain
and France no longer had the benefit of the veto. On November 2, the General Assembly
voted to censure Britain and France for their actions and the arguments of the Government
that Egypt was in breach of Security Council resolutions sounded even less impressive than
they had four days earlier. In the censure vote, sixty-five nations voted in favor while only
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five voted against (Britain, France, Israel, New Zealand and Australia). There were eight
abstentions, including Canada.70
On November 4, the Cabinet met to discuss the future of the operation against
Egypt and the prospect of Egypt and Israel supporting a cease-Fire before Britain had a
chance to intervene. It would have been difficult to justify military intervention between
\

conflicting parties who were no longer in conflict. The Cabinet was split on what to do in
such a contingency, with a clear majority favoring intervention, using the argument that
Britain was only holding the fort until United Nation’s forces could arrive to relieve them.
In the middle of the Cabinet meeting, news was received that the Israelis had not accepted
the cease-fire. Thus, a Cabinet split was avoided over the issue and Eden was given
approval to begin landings as soon as practical.71
The troops had hardly begun arriving on November 5 when they were ordered to
“expect a premature cease-fire” at midnight.72 Pressure on the Government from the
United States had reached the critical stage. Macmillan reported to the Cabinet that sterling
reserves had fallen to a critical level and that unless there were loan guarantees from the
United States, Britain could not prevent a run on the pound. Eisenhower had made it plain
that no such support would be forthcoming until Britain had begun to take demonstrable
steps towards withdrawal. Under such circumstances, Macmillan felt compelled to make
an abrupt about-face and advised that American demands be met so that Britain could
protect the pound. This was the decisive political turning point in the operation.73 The
United Nations General Assembly called again for a cease-fire and the Cabinet decided to
use this in an attempt to save face. Eden’s statement to the House of Commons on
November that a cease-fire had been ordered for midnight was met with cheers from both
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sides of the aisle. By the time the cease-fire went into effect, British and French forces had
managed to secure only 23 miles of the Canal south of Port Said.
The military operation, such as it was, was effectively over, but it had taken its toll
on Anthony Eden. On doctor’s orders, he was sent to Jamaica for rest. R.A. Butler was
left to preside over the Government in his absence and was charged with handling the
withdrawal of British soldiers from the Canal zone. During Eden’s recuperation in
Jamaica, Opposition questions to Ministers about their foreknowledge of the Israeli attack
were met repeatedly with twisted denials. On December 5, when Butler announced the
withdrawal to the House, Evelyn Shuckburgh, once Eden’s Private Secretary and then a
Foreign Office Middle East expert, commented, “All the Services feel they have been
betrayed, and that we will never be able to show any independence as a nation again.”74
With bitter sarcasm, one Conservative MP asked the Foreign Secretary, “Can my right
honorable and learned friend assure us now that we have agreed to withdraw our Army
from Egypt with no effective safeguards for our vital interests, that the necessary American
consent will be forthcoming, in due course, to bringing back our Prime Minister from
Jamaica?”75
Upon his return to the House on December 14, Eden was met with little fanfare.
Even the normally supportive Times mentioned how awkward the moment was for both the
House and the Prime Minister.76 On December 20 Eden addressed the issue of collusion
head-on during Question Time:
I do want to say this on the question of foreknowledge , and
say it bluntly to the House: There was no foreknowledge that
Israel would attack— but there was something else. There
was, we knew perfectly, a risk of it. In the event of a risk of it,
certain discussions and consultations took place, as I think was
absolutely right and as every Government would do.77
74Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951 - 56. (London: W eidenfeld and N icolson, 1986), p.
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In light of the negotiations at Sevres and the signed agreement with the Israelis and French,
there would appear to be little doubt that Eden, like Lloyd before him, lied to the House.
On January 7, Eden visited the Queen and resigned his position due to ill health.
After consultations with ranking members of the Conservative Party in both Houses of
Parliament, the Queen asked Macmillan to form a Government. In April, 1957, Egypt
reopened the Canal and offered its services to the British and French under the Six
Principles that had been negotiated the previous October by Lloyd.
A

nalysis

The Suez Crisis was a foreign policy disaster for Britain, but it was not just a
disaster in hindsight. The probable international repercussions of the plot with the French
and the Israelis were readily apparent to those in the government at the time. Why, then,
did the Eden Government embark upon an international adventure that would abandon the
three fundamental tenets of Britain’s post-war foreign policy: “solidarity with the
Commonwealth, the Anglo-American alliance, and adherence to the Charter of the United
Nations?”78 These were not the rash actions of any one individual, but rather the concerted
policy of the whole government. How could such a policy have received the endorsement
of the Government despite the safeguards that normally exist in Cabinet Government?
One of the significant questions surrounding the Suez Crisis is whether the Prime
Minister and other members of his Government corrupted the democratic process that is
essential to a properly functioning, responsible government. To varying degrees, most of
the principal organs of government were misled as to the true actions of the government.
Under such circumstances, a closer look at the roles of the various components of the
policy process is warranted— in particular, the Cabinet, the Civil Service and Military,
Parliament, and the Press. Then we can ask if the system performed well or poorly in this
case.

78Hugh Gaitskell quoted in Nutting, p. 125.

34

The Cabinet
The modem Cabinet meets infrequently, generally once a week for about two
hours, to discuss issues of importance to the Government. Through consensus, it
determines government policy and legislative strategies. The Cabinet always approves
major initiatives so as to assure that policies have been adequately prepared before being
publicly introduced, as well as to keep Ministers informed of the developments in other
departments so as to ensure broad-based support within the Government. Since Ministers
are collectively responsible for any action taken by the Government, it is important that they
be actively involved in Cabinet to ensure that policies are consistent with their political
principles and beliefs.
Modem interpretations of Cabinet Government identify the Prime Minister as the
pre-eminent actor in the Cabinet. To what extent was the Suez policy determined by
Anthony Eden? Was it primarily his failure? Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State at the
Foreign Office, places much of the blame for the crisis on Eden’s personal belief that
Nasser was seeking to undermine the British position in the Middle East and had to be
removed. Nutting states that Eden’s hatred of Nasser originated with the dismissal of
Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan, by King Hussein on
March 1, 1956. Eden felt that the embarrassing (for Britain) dismissal had been instigated
by N asser’s brand of Pan-Arabism. He therefore was determined to cut Nasser down to
size lest he further damage British prestige in the Middle East. Nasser also had close
relations with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and had recently recognized
Communist China, which indicated to the British that he was a potential ally of
Communists, working with them to undermine British interests. When Nasser nationalized
the Suez Canal, memories of Hitler’s march across Europe also stirred in British minds,
not least the mind of Anthony Eden, who had served in the Foreign Office under
Chamberlain and had resigned to protest appeasement. Eden determined that Nasser had
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given Britain a final, unacceptable provocation, and that it was time for him to go before he
irreparably damaged British interests in the Near East.79 Eden cabled President
Eisenhower in Washington expressing his concerns:
In the nineteen-thirties Hitler established his position by a series
of carefully planned movements. These began with the
occupation of the Rhineland and were followed by the
successive acts of aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland and the West. His actions were tolerated and excused
by the majority of the population of Western Europe...
Similarly, the seizure of the Suez Canal is, we are convinced,
the opening gambit in a planned campaign designed by Nasser
to expel all Western influence and interests from Arab
countries. He believes that if he can get away with this, and if
he can successfully defy eighteen nations, his prestige in Arabia
will be so great that he will be able to mount revolutions of
young officers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. (We
know he is already preparing a revolution in Iraq, which is
most stable and progressive.) These new Governments will in
effect be Egyptian satellites if not Russian ones. They will have
to place their united oil resources under the control of a United
Arabia led by Egypt and under Russian influence. When that
moment comes Nasser can deny oil to western Europe and we
here shall be at his mercy.80
As Eden saw them, therefore, the stakes were extremely high, but key members of the
Cabinet appear to have agreed with him.
To address the threat posed by Nasser, the Cabinet established the Egypt
Committee and presented it with a dual mission— first, to return the canal to international
control, and second, to deal a crippling blow to Nasser’s standing in the Arab community,
preferably by toppling his regime.81 This was not Eden’s policy alone. He was joined in
his distaste for Nasser by the overwhelming majority of his Cabinet. The members of the
Egypt Committee were fully informed at each stage of the crisis and one cannot, therefore,
attribute the Suez debacle to Eden’s judgment alone, not can it be blamed, as some home
argued, on the ill state of his health at the time of Suez.82 There is no question that his

79Nutting, p. 18, pp. 34 - 35 and p. 48.
80Robert M. Bow ie, Suez 1956. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 124.
81Lamb, p. 211.
»
82Nutting, p.32.
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physical condition was far from ideal. Eden himself never accepted that his health impaired
his judgment or his performance, and certainly his closest colleagues, Macmillan, Lloyd,
Salisbury, Butler and Head, were unanimous in their support for his policy. The fact is
that despite his health problems, Eden carried his colleagues with him through each stage of
the crisis, and no one at the time expressed doubts about his capacity to lead the nation.
The question which remains, however, is whether Eden and the members of the
Egypt Committee misled their colleagues in the Cabinet about collusion with Israel? The
chief protagonist, Anthony Eden always denied that there was any collusion, preferring
instead to acknowledge only that “a report came that Israel was about to mobilize.”83 In
their memoirs, ministers were reluctant to mention knowledge of any collusion with the
Israelis because such a deal did not reflect positively on their character and integrity, and
they were all covered by the convention of Cabinet confidentiality. These denials have led
many outside the Government to suppose that Eden and the members of the Egypt
Committee misled the rest of the Cabinet on the extent of Britain’s contacts with the
Israelis. Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is typical of most Ministers.
He stated in his memoirs:
In addition to my share in these months as Chancellor of the
Exchequer, I took my full part during the negotiations in the
weeks and months that followed in the deliberations in the
Committee of Ministers especially appointed to deal with the
crisis. A detailed account of the various moves has been set out
by Eden, and by many other historians. I shall confine myself
to those parts of the story which affected me particularly. But
the Prime Minister kept me in close touch with all his plans
during these anxious times, from the day of the seizure of the
Canal to the cease-fire. I share to the fullest extent the
responsibility of all the decisions, not merely from the normal
responsibility of a Cabinet Minister, but because I was one of
the circle of colleagues whom Eden consulted. Naturally, as I
was fully employed with my own problems from the financial
point of view, I could have only a general knowledge of the
intricate, but alas, ineffective attempts to reach a peaceful
solution in accordance with the claims of justice and equity.84
83Anthony Eden, The Memoirs o f Anthony Eden: Full C ir c le . (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1960), p. 584.
84Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm. 1956-59. (London: Macmillan and Company, 1971), p. 106.
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Despite this reticence, there is evidence that Macmillan was one of the advocates of a
“tough” policy in Egypt and the deal with Israel in particular. In a memo circulated to the
Egypt Committee on August 3, just a week after the Canal nationalization, Macmillan
argued for encouraging the Israelis to make some sort of move against Egypt right before
an Anglo-French invasion.85 Despite his claims of only “general knowledge” there is more
than ample evidence that he was in the thick of things, if not leading the pack.
R.A. Butler, Leader of the House, was an advocate of the “straight bash” involving
a direct assault on the Canal with the stated intention of liberating it from Egyptian control,
a position generally supported by the Chiefs of Staff. Although somewhat Machiavellian in
nature, it had the benefit of being relatively easy to explain to Parliament, the country, and
the world as necessary in the pursuit of a vital national interest. When discussions of a
possible Israeli attack on Egypt were raised initially at the October 18, 1956 Cabinet, before
there were any direct contacts with the Israelis, Butler recounted:
[Eden] confirmed that it was suggested with [the French] that in
the event of war between Israel and Egypt we should go in with
the French to separate the combatants and occupy the canal. I
asked if it were not more likely that Israel should attack Jordan.
He replied that in such an event, we would have to keep our
word to defend Jordan: the French had therefore been asked to
make this clear to Israel. I was impressed by the audacity of the
thinking behind this plan but concerned about the public
reaction. I wondered whether an agreement with the French
and Israelis, designed to free the canal and eventually
internationalize it, would not meet our objective, but the Prime
Minister said that things were now moving the direction he had
described and in all the circumstances I said that I would stand
by him.86
There is little in these words to indicate opposition to Eden’s goals, except perhaps a desire
to keep everything “above board”. Ultimately, the course embarked upon by the Cabinet
was to involve an agreement with the French and the Israelis, but it was also to include a
dishonest ultimatum and the introduction of British and French forces under the fairly

85Lamb, pp. 209 - 210.
86R.A. Butler, The Art o f the Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler. (Boston: Gambit Incorporated, 1972), p. 192.
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transparent guise of “impartial” policemen, rather than as agents furthering a vital national
interest.
The only obvious Cabinet dissent appears to have originated with the Defence
Minister, Walter Monckton. He was originally assigned to Defence because it was
supposed to have limited Parliamentary responsibilities that would give him a much needed
rest from the demanding tour he had just completed in the Ministry of Labour.87
Unfortunately, events were not kind to him and he found that he was soon immersed in the
intricacies of the Suez Crisis, surrounded by hawks waiting for the opportunity to use force
against Nasser. Throughout August and September, Monckton argued against military
action in the Egypt Committee, which included one particularly strong outburst directed at
Macmillan, who insisted on speaking of the use of force as a foregone conclusion at the
August 24 Egypt Committee meeting.88 On October 18, Monckton resigned as Minister of
Defence because of his opposition to any association with the Israelis. He remained in the
Cabinet as Paymaster General, however, for fear that his resignation from the Government
would result in its fall— apparently a worse eventuality than anything that he perceived
could happen as the result of British intrigue in Egypt.89
Despite the descriptions by Eden, Butler, and Macmillan of the Cabinet discussions
surrounding Suez, ultimately they tell us little about what truly happened in Cabinet
because each felt obligated to avoid mentioning the negotiations with Israel and France that
led up to the Israeli invasion on October 29. Fortunately, one crucial set of Cabinet
minutes, opened to scholars in 1987, and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd’s surprisingly
candid history of the conflict, published in 1978, are more enlightening. The October 23,
1956 Cabinet minutes noted, “From secret talks which had been held in Paris with
representatives of the Israeli Government, it now appeared that the Israelis would not alone

87Eden, p. 354 and Birkenhead, p. 305.
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launch a full-scale attack against Egypt.”90 In his history, Selwyn Lloyd refers to these
discussions with Israel as part of a contingency plan that would only be executed in the
event that negotiations with the Egyptians failed. Following the signing of the Sdvres
Protocol on October 24, the Egypt Committee decided to recommend the contingency plan
to the full Cabinet the following day. According to Lloyd, the decision of the Cabinet to
support the Egypt Committee’s recommendation was without dissent, following a full
discussion.91
On July 27, the Cabinet had decided that “[Egypt] must be subjected to the
maximum political pressure which could be applied by the maritime and trading nations
whose interests were most directly affected. And, in the last resort, this political pressure
must be backed by the threat— and, if need be, the use— of force.”92 On October 18, the
Cabinet had discussed for the first time the possibility of an Israeli attack against Egypt. It
was accepted, in principle, that if Israel attacked Egypt, Britain and France would intervene
to protect the Canal from the fighting. As with the decision about the ultimate use of force,
the Cabinet was unanimous in accepting this policy 93 On October 25, the most critical
meeting of all, the Cabinet had to make a decision dependent on actual events, not on
hypothetical situations. The Cabinet reiterated its earlier decision to intervene in the Canal
Zone in the case of an Israeli invasion of Egypt, perhaps because it was difficult to back
away from the decisions it had already made on October 18.94 Only two members
appeared to have had significant doubts— Monckton and Amory. Neither raised more than
token objections and both went along with the collective decision for action.95 According
to one Cabinet Minister, ‘T he whole Cabinet knew about Israel from the beginning. The

90Cabinet Minutes quoted in Carlton, Britain and th e vSuez Crisis, p. 142.
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Israel thing would have come to the top of the pile only after no other pretext remained.”96
By late October, all other options for action had apparendy been exhausted.
The Cabinet’s decision on October 25 to intervene with France in the event Israel
attacked Egypt conformed to the Sevres Protocol, but it was apparently made without many
of the ministers knowing of the collusion with Israel. Was this the case? There is little
doubt that most ministers knew that talks with Israel had actually taken place because the
contacts with the Israeli Government are mentioned in the October 23 Cabinet minutes.
W hether or not they knew that a promise of British action against Egypt was a sine qua non
for Israeli action is another quesdon. None of the ministers’ memoirs of the crucial
October 25 meeting reveal whether or not the Sdvres Protocol was specifically mentioned.
Most authors assume that it was not, but Anthony Head revealed to Alistar Home, Harold
M acmillan’s biographer, that there were four Cabinet meetings, held without minutes per
Eden’s instructions, at which the subject of collusion was discussed.97 According to
W alter Monckton, however,
One of the curious features of the whole affair as far as the
Cabinet was concerned was that partly owing to a not unnatural
habit on the Prime Minister’s part of preferring to take into
complete confidence only those with whom he agreed, many of
us in the Cabinet knew little of the decisive talks with the
French until after they happened and sometimes not even
then.98
There is no doubt that at least half the Cabinet knew of the plan. Eden, Lloyd,
Butler, Macmillan and Head all knew because they were all present when Dean delivered
the Protocol to Downing Street.99 Salisbury, Thorneycroft, Monckton, and Kilmuir were
all present at the October 18 meeting of the Egypt Committee when the French plan was
initially discussed, but perhaps other ministers had the luxury of turning a blind eye and
only dealing with a “hypothetical” situation. By the time the Cabinet met on October 25, all
" K e n n ett Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 370.
97Alistair Home, Harold Macmillan: Volume I. 1894 - 1956. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989), p. 429.
98Birkenhead, p. 308.
" L lo y d , p. 188.
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of the crucial players had already signed off on the plan and the other members of the
Cabinet were either not told or were simply presented with &fa it accompli. They would
have had to oppose all the senior party leaders if they had objections. If Head and the
other, anonymous, Minister are to be believed, the arrangement with France and Israel was
discussed by the full Cabinet. Head, as we have seen, is very specific that the collusion
was discussed at four unminuted Cabinet meetings. Given that the whole Cabinet was
informed that there were talks with the Israelis, it is reasonable to assume that those present
at the crucial Cabinet meetings chose to avoid being specifically tarred by their association
with the Government’s Suez decisions, and were able to do so because of the systematic
way in which Eden removed any reference to collusion from the public record. This
allowed them to deny having known of the plan with a reasonable assurance that no one
would contradict them.
The impetus for the decision on October 25 to support the Israeli attack was the
need either to initiate action or to stand down the 40,000 British troops who had been
mobilized in July and August and were biding their time at bases in Malta and Cyprus.
Their state of readiness was rapidly deteriorating, car batteries were running down, engines
were in need of maintenance, supplies were going bad, and the morale of the troops was
declining. The Chiefs of Staff pushed the Egypt Committee to allow a partial stand down,
but that was resisted because the removal of the military threat against Egypt might have
harmed the British negotiating position over the Canal. Having adopted a “tough” policy at
their July 27 meeting, the Cabinet was disinclined to change that policy in late-October.
The agreement with France and Israel to start a war in the Sinai solved three of the
fundamental problems facing the British: the need to do something with the troops in the
field, to bring the Canal under effective international control in the form of the Royal Navy,
and to rein in President Nasser. Since the Cabinet had no other policy available to it that
didn’t make it look like Britain was backing down, it opted in late October for the final
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contingency plan, the “Israeli Option.” 100 When the time for choosing which course of
action to follow arrived, therefore, the Ministers were divided only over means.
Although the Cabinet was one with the plans for invasion, they did not carry the
entire Government with them because there was some dissension in the ranks of the junior
ministers. The decision resulted in three resignations from the Government. Anthony
Nutting, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, resigned to protest the deal with Israel.
Edward Boyle, one of the Treasury Ministers, and William Clark, Eden’s Press Secretary,
also resigned, although it is not evident that either knew of the collusion with Israel. All
three defections were public embarrassments to the Government, and Nutting’s could have
been particularly damaging had he decided to condemn the Government in Parliament in his
resignation speech, but at the urging of Macmillan, he chose not to give one and undermine
the Government while British troops were in action.101 None of the defections had any
impact upon the Cabinet’s course of action.
The Civil Service and Military
The traditional role of the Civil Service in British politics is to advise Government
Ministers on available courses of action and to see that Governmental policy, once
determined, is implemented quickly and efficiently. Since many modem issues of domesdc
and international politics are quite complicated, the Civil Service also offers legal opinions
and serves as the source of institutional knowledge upon which ministers can rely for
advice. One of the philosophic foundations of the Civil Service is that it is the non-partisan
servant of the Government. Although sometimes accused of having an agenda of its own,
the Civil Service likes to pride itself on its loyalty and impartiality. Ministers are highly
reliant on their permanent staffs and usually forge close working relationships with the
Civil Servants.

100Ibid„ pp. 189 - 191.
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Government officials in the Civil Service and the senior officers in the military did
not play a role in preventing, or even significantly altering, the Cabinet’s decision to take
action at Suez. In fact, one of the unique characteristics of the Suez Crisis was the unusual
distance that existed between ministers and most permanent officials in the critical
departments. The exclusion of officials from the decision-making process, and the
systematic way in which the Prime Minister and the Cabinet avoided their advice,
exemplifies for many why the Government’s policy was doomed to failure. For purposes
of this discussion, only the Foreign Office and Defence Ministry will be examined because
they were the two departments most integrally involved in implementing the Government’s
Suez policy.
In the post-war Foreign Office, there remained a bias in favor of the Arabs in the
Middle East. Britain maintained an informal empire there consisting of a series of
protectorates, the Gulf Emirates, and nominally independent countries like Egypt, Jordan,
and Iraq led by Anglophile leaders who were economically and militarily supported by the
British. British support for these leaders dated to the First World War when their
predecessors rose in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire at the urging of British
agents, such as T.E. Lawrence. The British maintained close ties with these states partially
out of feelings of obligation but more so because of the ready supply of cheap oil they
provided to fuel the British economy. In the middle of this cozy relationship was Israel, a
“Zionist Entity” that occupied much of the former British League of Nations Mandate in
Palestine. Most Arabs, including those in the formerly French states of Syria and
Lebanon, felt that Israel was a colonial base dropped in their midst by the British to serve
Western interests in the region. Anti-Western feelings ran high in the general population
but were always tempered by leaders who sought Britain’s favor. The Foreign Office had
always sought to keep Israel at a distance and to embrace Arab leaders because of the value
of Middle Eastern oil. Israel had little that benefited Britain. None knew this Foreign
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Office bias better than Anthony Eden, a Persian expert who had spent most of his
ministerial career as Minister of State or Foreign Secretary prior to becoming Prime
M inister.102
Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, a Civil Service committee,
composed of officials from the. Foreign Office and Defense Ministry, was set up to parallel
the Egypt Committee and plan many of the particulars that did not concern Cabinet
Ministers. Among other things, as part of the Musketeer Plan for toppling Nasser, the
committee drew up detailed plans for an occupation government of Egypt. The role of this
committee was only to devise plans for implementing the proposed attack on Egypt, not to
determine when such an attack should take place.103 When it came to the secret deal with
the Israelis and the French, few in the Foreign Office were privy to the Government’s
secrets. When the French first proposed unleashing the Israelis to Eden at Chequers,
Nutting was allowed to put together a position statement with two Foreign Office officials,
Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Undersecretary, and Archibald Ross, the Assistant
Undersecretary (Middle East). Although Nutting was allowed to present this Foreign
Office brief, which opposed any collusion with the French and Israelis, at a “small meeting
of Ministers,” Eden had decided beforehand to reject the recommendations out of hand.104
Kirkpatrick was an atypical Civil Servant with an imperial attitude and a penchant
for dressing down “representatives of unsatisfactory smaller states.” 105 Unlike his senior
colleagues at the Foreign Office, he was not inclined to pander to Arab sensibilities, telling
Evelyn Shuckburgh, a former colleague, “[Eden] was the only man in England who
wanted the nation to survive; that all the rest of us have lost the will to live; that in two
years’ time Nasser will have deprived us of our oil, the sterling area fallen apart, no
European defense possible, unemployment and unrest in the U.K. and our standard of
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living reduced to that of the Yugoslavs or Egyptians.” 106 Despite assisting Nutting in
writing the Foreign Office’s paper indicating the pitfalls of allying Britain with France and
Israel, it is doubtful that he tried to restrain Eden’s aggressive ambitions in the Middle East.
Throughout the negotiations at Sdvres, only a few civil servants were involved.
During Eden and Lloyd’s October 1 meeting with French ministers, the British ambassador
to France was specifically not invited, an almost unheard of event and a significant protocol
violation which resulted in a letter of protest from the ambassador.107 He was also
excluded from the key meetings on October 22 and 24 and, due to their secret nature, it is
doubtful that he was subsequently informed that they had taken place. Donald Logan,
Lloyd’s junior private secretary, accompanied Lloyd to Sevres on October 22, but he was
not significantly senior to advise the Foreign Secretary on policy. On October 24, Eden
personally briefed Patrick Dean, a Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who led
the follow-up mission to Sdvres at which the Sdvres Agreement was signed. To ensure
continuity between the two trips, Logan accompanied Dean to Paris, but again, not as an
advisor on policy. Upon his return, Dean reported to a group of ministers including Eden,
Lloyd, Head, and Butler. Earl Mountbatten, Admiral of the Fleet, was also present.
During the crisis itself, the Foreign Office often found itself at something of a loss
to explain Britain’s ultimatum and the military action with France, in large part because so
few officials knew of it. Since the action was entirely inconsistent with the longestablished British policies of promoting peace and stability in the Middle East and support
for the United Nations, many ambassadors particularly found themselves in awkward
situations. When he lamented the gulf that separated Britain and Israel, Britain’s
ambassador to Israel, John Nicholls, was informed by Ben-Gurion that he had not been
fully briefed and that “our relations are a good deal closer than you think.” 108 William
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Hayter, the ambassador to Moscow, declared at a Kremlin reception, upon hearing of the
Israeli invasion of the Sinai, that Britain and France would vote against Israel in the
Security Council. Upon arriving back at the embassy a short time later, he was greeted
with a cable of the Anglo-French ultimatum. According to Hayter, “As I read it, I could
not believe my eyes; I began to wonder if I had drunk too much at the Kremlin. I felt quite
bewildered. The action we were taking seemed to me flatly contrary to all that I knew, or
thought I knew, about British policy.” 109
The Foreign Office was not advised of the talks with France and Israel for a variety
of reasons. First, as has been previously mentioned, Eden was well aware of the Foreign
Office’s pro-Arab bias, which would probably have led it to counsel against an invasion of
Egypt. Eden wanted to avoid fighting a battle with the bureaucracy that might put
limitations on his freedom and he felt that the Foreign Office might throw up some
significant obstacles to his agreement with the French and Israelis. When Nutting
suggested that a legal opinion on the plan be obtained from Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the
Foreign Office Legal Advisor, Eden declared, “Fitz is the last person I want consulted.
The lawyers are always against our doing anything. For God’s sake, keep them out of it.
This is a political affair.” 110 Eden’s fears of lawyers were well-founded. Two of the
“weak sisters” 111 in the Cabinet, Butler and Monckton, were lawyers by profession who
remained ill-at-ease about the casus belli— Butler because he felt the pretext unnecessarily
complicated the invasion and Monckton because he wanted to exhaust all other options
before resorting to force. Finally, the Sdvres Protocol called for complete secrecy about the
terms of the agreement. Beyond sharing it with Cabinet colleagues, a handful of people at
the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, and a few members of the military staff
who had to know in order to put the plan into effect, Eden kept the full secret o f the plans
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with France and Israel carefully contained. All told, only Kirkpatrick, Ross, Logan and
Dean at the Foreign Office appear to have known of the deal with the French and the
Israelis. Others might have guessed, but only those four had direct knowledge of its
existence.
The British military has always been responsive to civilian authority and is one of
the most disciplined armed forces of any country in the world. British leaders have always
been able to rely on the ability and willingness of the military to serve their political
masters. The British military has always concerned itself solely with military missions and
left political questions to their masters in the War Office and the Cabinet.
At the Ministry of Defence, the Suez story was somewhat, although not entirely,
different from the information vacuum that existed at the Foreign Office. One of the
problems with the agreement with the French and Israelis was that from the moment of
activation, the British invasion fleet, based in Malta, had to load its supplies and make the
1,000 mile journey to Port Said. All told it would be a ten day operation. The ability to
have the fleet just over the horizon from Port Said at the time of the ultimatum, and thus to
present the world with a fa it accompli, was preferable to waiting a week and a half for the
forces to deploy, but unfortunately, the pretext for the action, that the British and French
were going to act as peacekeepers, created a difficulty for the British. They could not
deploy the invasion force in advance of the Israeli attack because it would have been very
difficult to say that they were reacting to the Israelis if the invasion fleet appeared
immediately following the expiration of the ultimatum.112 One of the reasons the operation
failed, therefore, was because of the necessary delay involved in introducing British and
French forces into the Canal Zone, although efforts were made to accelerate the process.
Throughout the forces, only Lord Mountbatten, First Lord of the Admiralty, knew
that the Sdvres Protocol actually existed, committing the British to support the Israeli attack
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on Egypt. However, the military did not necessarily need to know that the agreement had
been signed in order to be instructed to begin preparing for a “police action” in the Canal
Zone. Senior officers all knew that there was a military option for resolving the crisis, but
some knew more than this. For example, General Sir Charles Keightley, the Allied forces
Commander-in-Chief, was present at the October 16 meeting at Downing Street during
which it was agreed that Lloyd would be sent to Sdvres and his understanding of the
situation was similar to that of the Chiefs of Staff. Because of his knowledge of Lloyd’s
mission to Sdvres, Keightley knew that the Israelis proposed to invade the Sinai on October
29. He was also well aware of the fact that if British forces could not begin preparing to
deploy until October 30, then they would not arrive at the Canal until November 10, a long
wait indeed. By the evening of October 30, however, Keightley was able to dispatch to
London that the invasion fleet had embarked six hours before the expiration of the
ultimatum, “as a result of previous preparedness and excellent work by all officers and
men.” 113 This meant that the invasion fleet was able to trim almost four days off the
timetable which would have had it arrive ten days after the British-French ultimatum. The
Malta invasion fleet had been scheduled to begin a signals exercise on October 27, and this
had been used as a cover to allow the British to begin loading and deploying some of their
ships. They were unable to load the invasion troops into their landing craft, however, for
fear of being unable to feign “surprise” at the Israeli invasion. An unsigned minute on
October 26, entitled, “Points for the Prime Minister,” stated, “The operations must now be
run as required militarily. But we will not make any overt moves which are not essential.
We will use the signal exercise as a cover plan.” 114
Lt. General Sir High Stockwell, the Task Force Land Commander was also wellinformed. On October 22 he learned from his French joint-staff of the planned Israeli
attack set for October 29. Two other British officers on his staff were advised, along with
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three others, at the War Office in London. On October 26, the French advised Stockwell
that the plan was definitely on and he advised the four admirals in the Mediterranean fleet,
Grantham, Dumford-Slater, Lancelot, and Power. Orders were issued which called for
ships to be loaded and prepared for the invasion/despite the fact that no official word had
come dowmfrom the Ministry of Defence, other than to hold Musketeer in a high state of
readiness.115
General Templer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, informed the
Quartermaster-General, “The PM has decided that the landing at Port Said must take place
as soon as possible but has also said that no one is yet to be told.” Various steps were
taken by lower-ranking officers to bring their troops to readiness, all the time hindered by
London’s concern that their moves should not be later used as evidence of the secret
plot.116 Many of the British officers and soldiers were able to put two and two together
and knew that the real invasion was on without being specifically told and were able,
“coincidentally,” to take steps to advance the operation’s timetable.117
Some highly-ranked officers objected to their civilian leaders that the invasion
seemed somewhat foolhardy. Most notable among these was General Keightley, the Allied
Commander-in-Chief, who expressed his concerns to the Prime Minister about the
impending operation on October 26, wondering whether Britain was going to be better off
afterwards. According to Mountbatten, “Eden gave him a very severe dressing down and
told him that these were questions with which military commanders should not concern
them selves.” 118
It is difficult to say to what extent officials in the Ministry of Defence knew of the
agreement with France and Israel. It is entirely possible that none of them knew. Certainly
the permanent officials do not merit even a passing mention in the various histories of the
115Ibid„ pp. 341 - 342.
116Ibid.
117D ouglas Clark. Suez Touchdown. A Soldier’s Tale cited in Kyle, p. 342.
118K yle, p. 335.
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Suez Crisis. In all likelihood, they were simply instructed to begin secretly preparing for
the invasion of the Canal. Since the Government had set and postponed invasion dates no
less than three times in September due to progress in diplomatic talks, this hot-cold policy
on Suez would not have been surprising to the Civil Servants at Defence.119 While the
coincidental timing of certain events could lead to later questioning, the Department could
readily pass responsibility to their political superiors. The implication of this is that
Ministry of Defence personnel were not able to advise the Government on the wisdom of
the policy.
In responsible government, the Civil Service is deeply involved in policy
development.120 Policy options are extensively analyzed and reports are written detailing
the advantages and disadvantages of particular courses of action. During the Suez Crisis,
this appears not to have been the case. The extent to which senior officials of the Civil
Service and the military were involved in the collusion with Israel goes only so far as
carrying out the decisions already made by senior members of the Government. In this
respect, their role as advisors was effectively abrogated. In fact, except for a few officials
at the highest levels of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, no one in the Civil
Service knew of the Government’s dealings with France and Israel. In such
circumstances, the Civil Service could not exercise any restraining influence on the
Cabinet.
P a rlia m e n t
In the Cabinet Government model, the Cabinet is responsible to Parliament for its
actions and must resign if it loses the support of a majority in the House of Commons.
Given that the Government represent a disciplined parliamentary party, it is very rare for
them to be dismissed because a majority of the Commons lose confidence in their policies.

119L ove, p. 458.
120David Butler, Andrew Adonis and Tony Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics o f the Poll
Tax. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 209.
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It is still the case, in modem Governments, that Cabinet Ministers must appear before
Parliament to justify the actions and policies of their departments, but the nature of the twoparty system and the tight party discipline, enforced by the party whips, dictates support of
the ministry by the Government’s Parliamentary Party, almost regardless of the policy.
While dissension within the ranks of the Government’s supporters can be tolerated to a
point, when the time comes to affirm the Government’s position in Parliament, all members
of the party are expected to vote in support of the Government.
Parliamentary opposition to the Suez policy in 1956 was vocal, but for the most
part, ineffective. The Conservative Government was able to apply its 59 member majority
to every division and win each vote comfortably. The party whips, led by future Prime
Minister Edward Heath, held wavering members in line and clearly demonstrated that “the
main task of Parliament is still what it was when first summoned, not to legislate or
govern, but to secure full discussion and ventilation of all matters.’’121 Looking at the Suez
debates, it would appear that the proper role of Parliament is to compel the Government to
defend its policies in public while at the same time creating a forum in which the
Government is assured of maintaining support. In addition, the Government may have
been aided by the fact that the Opposition chose to make the crisis a partisan issue. Not a
single Conservative MP was willing to vote against the Government for fear of contributing
to its downfall and possible replacement by a Labour regime. This fear put steel into the
spines of doubting Conservatives at a time when they might otherwise have questioned
their party’s leadership.122
Parliament met in almost constant session throughout the Suez Crisis, including a
rare Saturday afternoon debate. During this time, there were three significant votes on the
Suez policy, all of which the Government easily won. On October 30, Labour

12 ^ . S . Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution, quoted in David Butler, p. 224.
122Leon Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis. (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 93 94.
/

52

unexpectedly divided the House upon adjournment when Eden refused to delay action until
the Security Council, the United Nations, and the U.S. had been consulted. On November
1, the House divided again, this time on a motion of censure tabled by Gaitskell. The
Government prevailed with the unanimous support of its voting members, although it lost
the support of the Liberal Party. The final relevant vote on the Suez Crisis was on
November 8, immediately following the cease-fire announcement, when Labour tabled a
motion of no confidence in the Government. This time eight Conservative MPs
deliberately abstained from voting in support of the Government, despite the significance of
the vote, but they did so knowing their votes would not destroy the government.
Throughout the debates in September over the Government’s Suez policy, Labour
made it clear that it would only support the use of force if it were to occur under the
auspices of the United Nations. Eden rejected such a notion, stating that the Government
would act when it determined that action was appropriate and in the national interest. When
the Prime Minister announced to the House on October 30 that the Israelis had invaded the
Sinai and that Britain and France had delivered an appeal to the two belligerents, Labour
offered not to divide the House if the Government were to refer the matter to the United
Nations. When Eden rejected Gaitskell’s offer, the Government carried a 52 member
majority into the lobbies.123
The division of the House on October 30 was unexpected and the Whips had little
time to organize their forces. Subsequent votes on the crisis on November 1 and following
the cease-fire on November 8 were three line whips. Although there has long been
speculation that there were approximately 40 “Suez Rebels” in the party, few took the
unseemly step of voting against the Government or abstaining in Parliament.124 In fact,
not a single Conservative deliberately opposed the Government or abstained on a vote
supporting the Government in Parliament during the crisis. Nutting, clearly an opponent,
123Eden, p. 590.
124Epstein, p. 87.
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ceased attending Parliament. Following the announcement of the cease-fire, eight M.P.s
deliberately abstained on a Labour motion of censure to protest the Government’s action.
O f these, four were removed by their constituency associations. In addition to the eight
M.P.s who abstained, two others were reprimanded by their constituency associations.125
The Labour benches were unusually united in their opposition to the government,
despite the party’s open support for Israel and the large number of strongly Zionist Jews in
the Labour ranks. The sixteen Jewish members of the Parliamentary Labour Party voted
across the board with the party, causing the Jewish Chronicle to report:
Amid the vociferous protests of the Labour party against the
Government’s attitude in the Israel-Egypt clash, Jewish Labour
M.P.s were in a difficult position.
The Party Whips won the day, for, to a man, the Jewish
members of the Labour Party in Parliament voted against the
British and French military intervention in the Middle East.126
Only one member of the Labor party broke ranks. Stanley Evans was roundly cheered by
Conservative backbenchers when he rose to support the Government on November 1. He
abstained from Labour’s vote of censure, but voted with the Party on the November 8 vote
following the cease-fire announcement. In response, his constituency association
demanded, and received, his resignation as their M .P.127
During the crisis, Parliament was the scene of loud and divisive debating that
clearly represented the split in the nation over the Government’s policy. The large
parliamentary majority of the Conservative party was never seriously threatened by
defections and the damage done by junior ministerial resignations appears only to have
been to their own careers. Nevertheless, the abuse heaped upon the Government by the
Opposition was extreme and virulent. Selwyn Lloyd, a favorite target of Labour hecklers,
noted in hindsight, “I thought at the time that we were subjected to unnecessary burdens
and that the Leader of the House, Butler, and the Chief Whip, Heath, were being too
125Epstein, p. 97.
126Jewish Chronicle (London), November 9, 1956, p. 8 quoted in Epstein, p. 193.
127Epstein, pp. 128 - 132.
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accommodating to the Opposition. On reflection I think that they were right; it acted as a
safety valve; it kept the argument off the streets and in the House of Commons.” 128 There
is significant merit in this statement. While Parliament allowed for a full airing of divergent
views, the Government’s freedom of action was never hindered in the slightest by
Parliamentary criticism. But would the Government have survived if the collusive deal
with the French and Israelis had been publicly acknowledged?
Certainly, Parliament was grossly misled and lied to on at least two occasions, once
by Lloyd and once by Eden when each denied specific foreknowledge of the Israeli assault.
If Nutting had exposed them in a resignation speech to the House, it might, on the one
hand, have brought down the Government. On the other hand, it must be remembered that
the purpose of the collusive deal was to present the world with a pretext for action in the
Canal Zone which several members of the Cabinet favored without the pretext. They were
in favor of a “straight bash” with the stated purpose of liberating the Canal. Such a mission
would not have required any collusive or immoral agreement and would probably have
been accepted purely on face value, in the pursuit-of the national interest. Since the Cabinet
had committed to using force and was strongly supported by its backbenchers for a strong
line against Egypt, it is doubtful there would have been any desertions from the party.
According to Macmillan, “collusion wouldn’t have been disreputable if Anthony hadn’t
said it wasn’t true.” 129 If the Parliamentary Conservative Party was willing to stand by the
Government in circumstances that were highly suspect, as they were in late 1956, they
certainly would have stood behind the Government if it had declared that all other options
had been exhausted. In that sense, the issue of collusion is immaterial.
While Conservative support for the Government in Parliament was almost
unwavering, that support was by no means assumed by the Prime Minister. On several
occasions during the Suez Crisis, Eden seriously questioned whether or not Parliament
128Lloyd, p. 196.
129H om e, p. 433.
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would back his policy, in particular when he announced the cease-fire to the house. Just
prior to announcing the cease-fire to the Commons, Eden confided in President
Eisenhower, “If I survive here tonight, I will call you tomorrow.” 130 Clearly, he was in
doubt as to whether or not his party would support such a move prior to the Canal being
fully secured. Two years later, he told Selwyn Lloyd that he felt the whole Government
should have resigned when it became apparent that their policy had completely failed.131
In either event, although Eden questioned whether Parliament maintained confidence in his
Government, and even felt that they should have resigned, the Government never lost the
support of the majority.
Parliament certainly lived up to its obligations under the model of responsible
government. That is, it required that the Government publicly defend its policies and be
subjected to criticism by its opponents. However, the fact that the Government was able to
present a false pretext to Parliament to justify the invasion raises a question as to the extent
to which the Cabinet is really responsible to Parliament. In the face of a policy failure and
an embarrassing withdrawal, the Government was able to maintain its Parliamentary
majority without an early dissolution. If the Suez Crisis demonstrated to the world that
Britain and France had ceased to be first-class world powers, it demonstrated to observers
of British politics the true strength of party discipline in Britain, albeit at the expense of
weakened Parliamentary authority.
The Press and Public Opinion
The press in modern democracies has long made claims of holding a special place in
the decision-making process. Certainly, this has been the case in Britain, with its widelycirculated daily newspapers and heightened public awareness of political issues. The role
of the “fourth estate” is sometimes difficult to pin down and is certainly highly

130K yle, p. 470-1.

13Carlton, Britain and,the Suez Crisis, p. 92.
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controversial, especially in cases such as the Suez Crisis, when the nation is divided. The
press can often influence as well as mirror the public’s feelings about controversial events.
Looking back to the origins of the Suez Crisis, it is possible that Eden was
influenced by the press to take a strong stand against Nasser to demonstrate that he was a
strong leader. According to Nutting, Eden had been particularly stung by an editorial in the
Daily Telegraph that implied that he needed to be in firmer control of his Government. The
article stated that the Prime Minister had a habit of emphasizing points by placing his fist
into the palm of his other hand, “but the smack is seldom heard!” Having lived in
Churchill’s shadow for fifteen years, Eden was sensitive about perceptions of being a weak
leader. As a result, it is possible that his firm line against Nasser was motivated, in part, to
prove his critics wrong.132
Newspapers and radio and television news reporting were all evident during the
Suez Crisis. Newspapers, in particular, took sides on the issue. Using the circulation
counts of various newspapers to weight their importance, one survey found a breakdown
of 43% of circulation in favor of Bridsh action, 40% opposed, and the balance neutral.
The breakdown followed traditional lines with pro-Conservative papers taking a supporting
line and anti-Conservative papers taking an opposing line.133 The only significant
departure, as has been previously mentioned, was the Conservative Times which sat on the
fence because of its editor’s concerns about the deal with the French and Israelis brought
on by his briefing by Eden.134
The BBC, and its Overseas Services in particular, faced a unique challenge not
faced by the print media. Since its reach was global, the BBC could be a propaganda arm
for the Government. Unfortunately for the Government, the BBC liked to think of itself as
autonomous and nonpartisan, which presented a unique challenge for a Government

132Nutting, p. 25.
133Epstein, p. 156.
134K yle, p. 302.
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embarking on a foreign policy adventure in the face of strong public opposition, which the
BBC reported. On several occasions, Eden requested that the Foreign Office try to reign in
the BBC, going so far as to send Nutting to the BBC to advise the broadcasting services
that the Government needed to have its views presented “without having contrary views
also carried to the confusion of peoples in certain parts of the world who do not understand
our political system.” 135
While the BBC attempted to remain impartial throughout, it was being pulled in
more than one direction. Following an address to the nation on November 3 by Eden in
which he put forth the Government’s policy and the reasons for action in Egypt, the
Opposition demanded the opportunity to reply. Although British forces were in action and
the Government portrayed the Prime Minister’s speech as a “national occasion,” and not
partisan, Gaitskell was able to convince the BBC to give him time, in part, because he
threatened to denounce any attempt to suppress the Opposition. On November 4,
therefore, Gaitskell addressed the nation, urging everyone to appeal to his MP “to support a
new Prime Minister in halting the invasion of Egypt, in ordering a cease-fire and complying
with the decisions and recommendations of the United Nations.” 136 While the speech was
generally well-received, many Government supporters considered it a treasonous act, their
hostility reinforced by the fact that Gaitskell had no record of military service. The speech
clearly added to the divisive atmosphere surrounding the controversy. The Government,
therefore, had to operate in the climate of a very critical media. Unlike World W ar II, when
the press was a conduit for Government propaganda, every aspect of the Government’s
Suez policy was subjected to cridcal scrutiny. On balance, however, this did not affect
policy. Britain ceased its military operation in Egypt because of intemadonal pressures, not
criticism in Britain.

135Ibid., p. 337.
136Ibid., p. 433.
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Public opinion similarly had no marked impact on policy. There is no question that
Britain was greatly divided by the Government’s policy. The political consequences of
appearing to be disloyal while soldiers are fighting and dying can be serious for the
opposition in most countries, but the Government’s failure to gain wide spread support
before embarking on the invasion emboldened the Labour leadership to try to exploit the
issue. The huge attendance at the Labour rallies in Trafalgar Square give testimony to the
fact that many of Labour’s supporters backed their representatives in Parliament, but public
opinion polls taken during the crisis clearly show that the Conservative Government
received a 5% positive bump in the polls while Labour sank less than 3%. Liberal Party
support, never large to start, was unaffected by the party’s stand against Suez. Polls taken
to gauge the public’s support for the Government’s policy found half the population
supporting the decision to send British troops to occupy the Canal Zone while more than a
third opposed the action. More than 75% of Conservatives supported the Prime Minister as
well as 28% of Labour supporters and half of all Liberal supporters. After the crisis was
resolved, the only change in the numbers was an increase in support for the Tory
Government to 95% among Conservatives while support among the other parties remained
the sam e.137 The Government lost no support within the general population following this
obvious policy failure.
Two months after British forces had to stop short of their objectives, the
Government held the same level of public confidence as it did the day the intervention was
announced, but public support for the action showed a clear split by party affiliation.
Rank-and-file supporters of the Conservative Party were overwhelmingly in support of the
intervention, many because they felt it was long overdue. The question remains, though,
would the Government have maintained this support if the collusion with Israel were
publicly acknowledged? The answer is probably yes. The Israeli invasion was a pretext

137Ibid„ pp. 145 - 147.
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for intervention. If the Government had simply decided to invade the Canal Zone in the
national interest, without any other casus belli, they would probably have maintained the
support of their supporters in the general public, many of whom looked back nostalgically
on Britain’s colonial past. Even after the cease-fire was announced, support for the
Government’s intervention actually increased, leading one observer to speculate, “This
suggests ... that many Englishmen were not originally so much troubled about the moral or
legal offensiveness of Britain’s action, or even about its likely failure, as they were about
the sheer physical consequences of a war that might spread or be prolonged.” 138 Unlike
the politicians in Downing Street and at Westminster, it is possible that voters had more
practical concerns than the significant legal questions surrounding the action. They were
willing to support the Government, regardless of the justification, as long as the campaign
was short and contained.
C onclusio n

One fundamental question posed by the Suez Crisis is whether or not Cabinet
Government lived up to its constitutional responsibilities, despite the tensions and
irregularities imposed by the collusive agreement with the French and the Israelis. There
appears to be ample evidence that the Cabinet was kept fully informed of the Prime
M inister’s negotiations with the French and Israelis, and even had an opportunity to reject
the policies that he was pursuing. While it can be argued that the Cabinet was either
advised too late in the process to prevent the secret deal with Israel from being
consummated or not advised at all, there is no doubt that it agreed unanimously to follow
the scenario proposed by the Prime Minister, which differed only in detail from the Sdvres
agreement. Collusion or not, the policy of the Cabinet would not have changed. If the
Cabinet had opposed an invasion, neither the operation against Egypt nor Eden’s
premiership could have continued. The Cabinet shares collective responsibility for the

138Ibid„ p. 171.

60

actions of the Government and in this case it exercised its authority collectively. All major
decisions were made by a united Cabinet, and the failure was a collective one. The only
way in which the Cabinet Government model fails to accurately explain the development of
the Suez Policy was the deliberate decision to exclude the civil service from the process,
with few exceptions. As a result, the usual process of inquiry and review was by-passed,
but it was done knowingly by the Prime Minister and his colleagues.
Constitutionally, the entire Government was responsible for the Suez debacle.
Collective responsibility serves to protect those responsible for failures in governmental
policy. Such is certainly the case of the Eden Government. Had it not been for his health,
Anthony Eden probably could have continued as Prime Minister without facing significant
opposition within his own party, but his position was weaker than it had been and the
international relationship with the United States was severely damaged. Eden’s resignation
served to solve many problems, not the least of which were restoring close ties with the
United States and shifting responsibility for the Government’s Suez Policy from the
remaining senior ministers’ shoulders.
Once the Suez policy emerged from the Cabinet and entered Parliament and the
media, the British model worked about as well as it could. Parliament is, at best, a
sounding board. Given the realities of majority government, Parliament could do no more
than air the issue, and open the Government to scrutiny. It did this, as did the press.
However, the model concentrates enormous powers in the hands of the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet, and the Suez Crisis demonstrated the full implications of this fact.
In the final analysis, the Government’s parliamentary majority was secure and the
British public was convinced that something needed to be done about Nasser. The pretext
for the invasion, that it was a peacekeeping mission, was unnecessary for Parliament or
public opinion. Rather, it was created for foreign consumption and to meet a new
international standard in a world that was very different from the one that existed prior to
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World W ar Two. In a situation that placed great demands on the British Constitution,
Cabinet Government continued to function within the confines of convenuon. While the
Cabinet failed in its responsibilities to inform Parliament fully of its actions, Parliament and
the public continued to support the Ministry, even though it was embarking on a highly
questionable adventure. The conventions that tie Parliament to the Government held tighter
sway over MPs than did the events of the time. By complicating a major Government
policy with secret deals and deceit, the Government succeeded only in testing the
conventions that bound them to their supporters.
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APPENDIX I

T h e E d e n C a b i n e t - O c t o b e r 1956*

Prime Minister

Anthony Eden

Lord President of the Council
Foreign Secretary
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Leader of the House of Commons
Lord Chancellor
Minister of Defence
Home Secretary
Colonial Secretary
Secretary for Commonwealth Relations
Secretary of State for Scodand
Minister of Labour
President of the Board of Trade
Minister of Housing and Local Government
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
Minister of Education
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Pensions
Paymaster-General

Lord Salisbury
Selwyn Lloyd
Harold Macmillan
R.A. Butler
Lord Kilmuir
Anthony Head
Gwilym Lloyd-George
Alan Lennox-Boyd
Lord Home
James Stuart
Iain Macleod
Peter Thomeycroft
Duncan Sandys
Lord Woolton
Sir David Eccles
Derek Heathcoat Amory
Charles Peake
Walter Monckton**

* Richard Lamb, The Failure o f the Eden Government. (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987), p. xii.
** Walter Monckton was Minister o f Defence until October 18, 1956. Anthony Head was War Minister,
one o f the Junior Ministers in the Ministry o f Defence.
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